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RELEVANT STATUTE 
26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient — Consent of 
department required -- Department's right to intervene -
Department's interests protected - Attorney's fees and 
costs. 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or 
settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party 
for recovery of medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability 
for which the department has provided or has become obligated 
to provide medical assistance, without the department's written 
consent. 
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in 
an action commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical 
costs connected with the same injury, disease, or disability, for 
which it has provided or has become obligated to provide 
medical assistance. 
(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's 
written consent as required by Subsection (l)(a), the 
department is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, 
or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the action, 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any 
party to which the proceeds were made payable all medical 
assistance which it has provided and retains its right to 
commence an independent action against the third party, 
subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under 
what terms the interests of the department may be represented 
in an action commenced by the recipient. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total 
recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share 
of the costs in an action that is commenced with the 
department's written consent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF FACT 
1. Suggestion of Partial Mootness. Since the Appellants' 
Brief was filed in April 2003, the State has settled with Streight and the 
Jensens, and has been paid. See Exhibit 1, Order. The only matter that 
remains in dispute is whether or not the Jensens' attorney, the Sykes law 
firm, is entitled to an attorney's fee. 
2. Cert. Denied inMinnesota v. Martin. On June 27, 2003, 
the United States Supreme Court denied the State of Minnesota's Petition 
for Certiorari, seeking to reverse the decision of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court which held Minnesota's Medicaid reimbursement liens against 
recipients to be illegal. Minnesota v. Martin, 123 S.Ct. 2668, 156 L.Ed.2d 
655, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5037 (June 27, 2003). 
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ARGUMENT 
REPLY POINT I 
- Statute and Case Law Support Appellants -
THE PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§ 26-19-7 DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PUNITIVE 
MEASURES ADVOCATED BY THE STATE. THE 
STATUTE AND CASE LAW PROVIDE REMEDIES FOR 
THE STATE, BUT DO NOT INCLUDE ELIMINATING 
THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY'S FEE. 
The State argues that law firms which represent clients who do 
not obtain consent before maldng claims should be penalized by withholding 
attorney fees. This is contrary to law, logically flawed and unjust. 
The relevant statute, Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7, contains 
no penal provision justifying the withholding of fees. Indeed, the State's 
contention is a fatal leap in logic when viewed in light of the statute. 
Furthermore, this Court's recent rulings, including ORS v. McCoy, 999 P.2d 
572 (Utah 2000), make it clear that: 1) the State has a priority lien on the 
proceeds of the settlement and may assert the lien against a recipient; and 2) 
when the settlement is obtained by a recipient's private attorney, the State 
must pay its share of attorney fees on the lien amount recovered as a result. 
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A. The Statute Makes No Allowance For Withholding 
Fees, 
A plain reading of Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-7 reveals no 
punitive measures for failure to gain the State's consent to represent its 
interests. The Court's "primary responsibility in construing legislation is to 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Christensen v. Industrial Commn, 
642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982). The best indicator of legislative intent is 
the plain meaning of the statute. Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
Section 26-19-7(l)(a) of the Utah Health Code states that the 
recipient "may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, compromise, 
release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of medical costs . . . 
without the department's written consent." Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 
(emphasis added).1 Subsection 26-19-7(2)(a) provides that where the 
recipient proceeds without obtaining written permission, "the department is 
not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered 
or made on the claim or in the action." Furthermore, 26-19-7(2) (b) provides 
1
 Note that consent is only required for an action that seeks recovery of 
"medical costs" paid by the State; no consent is required to file a personal injury 
action that does not involve medical costs. 
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the remedy for the State in cases where the recipient proceeds without 
consent. It reads: 
The department may recover in full from the recipient or any 
party to which the proceeds were made payable all medical 
assistance which it has provided and retains its right to 
commence an independent action against the third party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7 (2001) (emphasis added). 
The State's remedies, where the recipient pursues the claim 
without consent, are limited to: 1) recovering directly against the recipient; 
or 2) recovering against the payee; and/or 3) bringing an independent action 
against the third party. This is a full statutory arsenal of explicit remedies 
where advance consent is not obtained. Absent from the arsenal is any 
explicit or implied remedy of denying counsel his/her fee. The legislation 
makes no allowance for the punitive measure of withholding attorney fees 
where consent is not given. Indeed, McCoy holds that even if the State 
moves directly against the recipient that it must pay its share of attorney 
fees. Appellants only ask that the Court follow the plain meaning of the 
statute and hold the State to the remedies it is given, and not allow an 
additional punitive remedy that is not only contrary to McCoy, but unjust. 
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B. Case Law: The State Must Pay Attorney Fees. 
In ORS v. McCoy, this Court ruled that when the State recovers 
directly from the recipient, and where the recipient has retained private 
counsel, the State must pay its share of attorney fees. First, McCoy follows 
the rulings in Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998), andS.S. 
v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998), by holding that the proceeds of a 
settlement with a third party tortfeasor do not become the property of the 
recipient (or any other person) until the State's lien is satisfied. McCoy, 999 
P.2d at 575 ("any third-party recovery does not become the 'property' of the 
recipient until the recipient has reimbursed the State for all medical 
assistance the State provided." Id.) Second, once the State has been 
reimbursed, McCoy makes it equally clear that the State has an obligation to 
pay attorney fees for the private attorney's efforts. The opinion 
contemplates at least three different scenarios: 
In sum, while the Act provides discretion to the State when 
selecting a suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, 
each method of recovery requires the State to pay its share of 
attorney fees. The State may (1) take action directly against the 
third party, for which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant 
consent to recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, 
whereby the State's recovery will be reduced by reasonable 
attorney fees and, if any, its proportionate share of the costs of 
an action; or (3) refuse consent and proceed against the recipient 
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after the recipient recovers from the third party, in which case the 
State's recovery shall he reduced by reasonable attorney fees. 
McCoy, 999 P.2d at 577 U 19 (emphasis added). Thus, however the State 
gains its reimbursement (here, option three, by proceeding directly against 
the recipient), where the recipient has recovered through the efforts of a 
private attorney, the State must pay its proportionate share of attorney fees 
and costs. 
Neither the statute nor McCoy make any link between obtaining 
consent and the payment of attorney fees. Accordingly, the State must pay 
attorney fees on its lien recovery here, which recovery was procured through 
the efforts of Streight's counsel. 
REPLY POINT II 
- No Prejudice to the State -
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY ACTUAL 
PREJUDICE FOR APPELLANTS' ALLEGED FAILURE TO 
OBTAIN CONSENT. THE STATE HAS BEEN PAID AND 
RECEIVED A SUBSTANTIAL WINDFALL. 
The State has failed to show that it has suffered any prejudice 
by the actions of Ms. Streight or the law firm in this case. First, the Jensens 
gave proper notice to the Department of Health as required in § 26-19-7. 
Second, the reimbursement to the State in this case is a windfall considering 
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the facts of the case2 and the remote likelihood that the State would have 
investigated or litigated it. Third, during this litigation, the ORS settled 
with Streight and has been paid. Fourth, and finally, even if the attorney's 
actions hindered the State's ability to move against the third-party tortfeasor, 
McCoy requires that the State pay its share of the attorney fees. 
A. Ms. Streight's Parents Notified the Proper Agency. 
The State argues that it was prejudiced because the Jensens, Ms. 
Streight's parents, gave notice to only the Department of Health, and not to 
the ORS, the agency collecting the reimbursements. State's Brief p. 23 . This 
argument is directly contradicted by the Health Code and by the facts. 
Section 26-19-7 requires that the recipient seek "the department's written 
consent" to recover costs paid by Medicaid. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7. 
Section 26-1-2 defines "Department" as the Department of Health as 
contained in all chapters of Title 26. Utah Code Ann. § 26-1-2. The Office 
of Recovery Services is a subdivision of the Utah Department of Human Services. 
2
 The tort plaintiff, Peggy Sue Streight, was hit by a car while jaywalking 
across the Main Street of Gunnison, going to a movie at night, in the rain and 
wearing dark clothes. The only reason the insurance company paid was that the 
Sykes law firm proved that Peggy Sue was "legally blind" on that date. She had an 
eye procedure as part of her diabetes treatment, which reduced her vision on the 
night of the accident, even though the vision was later restored. 
- 8 -
There is simply no requirement that Ms. Streight give any notice or 
seek the consent of the Office of Recovery Services. 
The Jensens gave notice on their Medicaid applications of the 
name of the third party and her insurance company. R. 565. The notice was 
provided twice, several months before the settlement. Appellants' Brief, p.4 
11 3. Even if these application materials were filed at the Department of 
Workforce Services, one can hardly fault the Jensens or Ms. Streight for 
failing to give notice to an office in the Department of Human Services 
which has no apparent connection with either the department described in 
the statute or the office where they applied for benefits. The State's 
argument is illustrative of the bureaucratic, Kafkaesque nightmare faced by 
Ms. Streight and the law firm in this case. 
B. The State Reimbursement Is a Windfall. 
Given the facts in the underlying tort case, the State's 
contention that it would have gone after the third party is without basis in 
fact and highly improbable. Ms. Streight was jaywalking across Main Street 
in Gunnison, Utah, at about 9:30 p.m., in the rain and wearing dark clothing, 
when she was struck by an oncoming car. She was on her way to a movie at 
the local theater, accompanied by her boyfriend. Appellants' Brief, Fact 1. 
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The law firm was justifiably highly skeptical about the chances of maldng any 
recovery from the driver's insurance at all. It was only after some 
investigation that the Firm found out that Ms. Streight had undergone a 
medical procedure on her eyes earlier that day which impaired her vision to 
the extent that she was temporarily legally blind. She therefore could not be 
negligent, vis-a-vis the driver, opening the way to recovery. That the State 
would have chosen to pursue this third-party case, out of hundreds that it 
likely considers to pursue, is simply unbelievable. Accordingly, the State's 
recovery is a windfall, due solely to counsel's efforts. 
C. Even If the Recipient Hindered the State's Claim 
Against the Third Party, McCoy Requires the State to 
Pay Attorney Fees. 
Even if the State was somehow prejudiced in its ability to recover 
from the third-party tortfeasor because of Ms. Streight's actions, under 
McCoy the State still must pay its share of attorney fees for at least a couple 
of reasons. In McCoy, the attorney failed to alert the State when he 
discovered that he had previously misinformed it about the identity of the 
insurance company which insured the third party. McCoy, 999 P.2d at 578. 
Apparently, that failure by McCoy significantly hindered the State's ability 
to give notice to the third party of its claim or to intervene in settlement 
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negotiations. Id. Nevertheless, the majority in McCoy held that despite the 
apparent prejudice to the State's ability to pursue the third party, McCoy 
deserved to be paid because the State recovered its lien due to McCoy's 
efforts in settling the case. 
Likewise, in the case at hand, the State got paid due to the 
efforts of counsel. The notice given by the Jensens in the Medicaid 
application may have unintentionally impeded the State's ability to pursue 
its claims against the third party. ORS did not immediately discovery the 
identity of the insurer, even though a sister agency had notice, because there 
was no direct, speedy communication between the two agencies at the time. 
This delay impeded ORS's ability to seek a recovery from the insurance 
companies, but it was not the fault of the Jensens and, more importantly, 
resulted in no prejudice. The delay did not block the State's ability to seek 
recovery from Ms. Streight personally. Furthermore, few would argue that 
the State would ever have known or cared whether there were insurance 
policies had not the law firm obtained the $110,000 settlement. When 
considered carefully, the State's complaints of prejudice ring hollow. 
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REPLY POINT HI 
- The Law Firm's Good Faith -
THE STATE'S CHARGES OF DECEPTION AND 
CONCEALMENT ARE MALICIOUS AND UNTRUE. THE 
LAW FIRM OPERATED IN GOOD FAITH 
THROUGHOUT THESE PROCEEDINGS AND DID NOT 
MISREPRESENT ANYTHING TO THE TRIAL OR 
PROBATE COURT. 
The law firm was honest in its representations to the trial and 
probate court and acted in good faith throughout all proceedings in this case. 
The State wrongly accuses the law firm of deceptive and bad faith conduct. 
These insinuations and accusations are improper under the circumstances 
and without any basis in fact. 
The State accuses the law firm of "misleading the probate court 
in its petition for Appointment of Conservatorship by stating that '[t]here 
are no other persons interested in Peggy Sue's estate who are entitled to 
notice pursuant to law, other than the natural parents and guardians, Bud 
and Karen Jensen.7" State's Brief p. 15. This accusation of what amounts to 
fraud upon the court is simply untrue. 
At the time these representations were made to the probate 
court, the law firm believed in good faith that any lien against the settlement 
proceeds was not valid and, therefore, the State was not "entitled to notice." 
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That representation was made about two months before the decisions in 
Wallace and S.S. were handed down by this Court. Appellants' Brief, p. 5. 
The law firm then had a good faith belief that the Medicaid lien was an 
illegal, invalid lien against the personal property of a medicaid recipient. 
Two justices of this Court ultimately agreed, writing a strongly-worded, 
detailed dissent in Wallace and S.S. Wallace, 972 P.2d at 449-452. 
Ultimately, this Court adopted a very novel and unpredictable legal analysis, 
i.e., that a personal injury settlement "is not the property" of the personal 
injury victim, at least until the lien has been paid. Wallace, 972 P.2d at 448. 
The law firm's view had substantial legal support in 1998. This 
was recently again validated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Martin v. 
City of Rochester, 642N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002). That Court, in a case virtually 
identical in principle to Wallace, held that the Medicaid lien directed against 
the recipient was illegal and invalid under federal law. A petition to review 
this ruling by the State of Minnesota was recently denied by the United States 
Supreme Court. Minnesota v. Martin, 123 S.Ct. 2668, 156 L.Ed.2d 655, 
2003 U.S. LEXIS 5037 (June 27, 2003). Appellants were therefore in good 
company in their legal analysis, although later determined to be in the minority 
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in Utah. This is a far cry from the deception and impure motives charged by 
the State in its brief. 
The State further alleges that the speed with which Appellants 
acted in securing the settlement and putting the proceeds into a special needs 
trust must have meant that counsel had spurious motives. Wrong! This law 
firm works with speed on all of its cases, particularly where there is a potential 
settlement on the table. The Jensens and the law firm had no other motive 
in moving quickly than to negotiate a settlement and move rapidly to make 
it available to this family that was in destitute circumstances.3 The family 
cried out for help and when the policy limits were offered, there was simply 
no reason to delay the settlement. The insinuation that the firm had some 
dark motive is retributive, baseless and possibly a reflection of adverse 
litigation results over the years.4 
3
 Peggy Sue Streight was a 38-year-old single mother of three, and obviously 
indigent because she qualified for Medicaid. Her parents were elderly and retired, 
and had no resources to care for their severely disabled daughter. R. 335. 
4
 The Sykes law firm began litigation with ORS almost a decade ago, in 
1994, in the Wallace case. In that case, counsel began looking for a way to force 
the State to pay an attorney fee on a difficult case in which a settlement had been 
procured, from which the State would be paid in full. The State had come in at 
the last minute and was refusing to pay a fee. The Sykes law firm opposed the 
State in not only the Wallace case, but Houghton I (962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998)) and 
Houghton II (57 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002)). Houghton /dealt with the State's attempt 
to disqualify counsel, which disqualification was reversed 5-0 in favor of the law 
firm. Houghton II upheld the validity of the lien, but reversed the State's attempt 
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The law firm believes that the intemperate language and 
unfortunate, vindictive and untrue allegations in the State's Brief are in 
response to the firm's good faith, ardent opposition to Medicaid liens. For 
nearly 10 years, the law firm's clients have responsibly and in good faith 
opposed the enforcement of these liens in the legal arena. In Wallace, the 
firm's client was injured when the car in which he was riding struck some 
livestock on the road. It was a difficult, problematic case at best. Notice of 
the claim and a request for consent was filed early, with no immediate 
response. The plaintiffs were nearing the end of settlement negotiations with 
the insurers when the ORS stepped in, rejected the law firm's request for 
consent, and recovered 100% on its lien (half of the total recovery) without 
paying attorney fees. Id. at 447-48. 
Since the Wallace appeal, the ORS has continued to litigate with 
clients of this law firm, which litigation has been very difficult. ORS actually 
claimed that the law firm had "represented the State" in Medicaid claims and 
therefore should have been disqualified in Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 
P.2d 58 (Utah 1998) (Houghton I). This Court rejected that argument. See 
fn. 3, above. Late last year, this Court again rejected ORS arguments that 
to dismiss a class action for attorney fees based upon this Court's holding in 
McCoy. Houghton has been in litigation for eight years. 
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the McCoy case should not apply to a class action of individuals suing the 
State for illegally failing to pay an attorney fee on settlements. See fn. 3, 
above. That decision was also 5-0 against the State. Houghton v. Dept. of 
Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067 at 1070 (Utah 2002) {Houghton II). 
Houghton III continues to be hotly litigated on remand. 
We believe that all of the inaccurate statements and 
characterizations are a reflection of this ongoing litigation. This is neither in 
the interest of the State nor in furtherance of the law. Appellants are battle-
weary, but remain determined. 
By the way, this very case offers an important postscript on the 
importance of speed in settlements. This entire case was essentially settled in 
principle in 2000. However, plaintiffs' counsel delayed finishing up the 
details by 30-40 days, during which time Peggy Sue moved out of the house 
that was purchased with the settlement proceeds, and the State pulled the 
settlement offer off the table as a result. R. 722 (08/23/00 letter from 
Stephanie Saperstein to Robert Sykes withdrawing settlement offer and 
indicating intent to litigate). Personal injury attorneys have learned that 
speed in this type of litigation is often essential, as illustrated by the failed 
settlement in this case. 
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REPLY POINT IV 
- McCoy Should Not Be Reversed or Modified -
THE McCOY CASE IS GOOD LAW, IS JUST, AND 
SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED OR SUBSTANTIALLY 
MODIFIED, AS THE STATE SEEKS TO DO IN THIS 
APPEAL. 
A. Introduction. 
The State's main objective in this appeal is to obtain reversal or 
substantial modification of McCoy. It is fairly evident that the State feels 
that these are "bad facts" for Appellant because of the alleged 
"misrepresentation," which the State hopes to bootstrap into adverse action 
against McCoy. This Court should reject this invitation. McCoy is good law 
and is fair to both the State and Medicaid recipients. It has introduced 
stability into this area of the law. 
B. Exaggerated, Incomplete Presentation of Facts. 
As noted above, the State's presentation of the facts is 
exaggerated and incomplete. These facts do not justify reversal, 
reconsideration or modification of McCoy, as urged by the trial judge. The 
true facts are simple: the State received timely notice of the tort defendant's 
name and her insurance company; the Sykes law firm operated in good faith 
in diligently pursuing Peggy Sue Streight's claims; there was no 
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misrepresentation to the probate court as the law firm operated under a good 
faith belief in the illegality of the State's lien claims against a Medicaid 
recipient; this Court narrowly rejected those arguments, but another 
respected Supreme Court has accepted them; and the U.S. Supreme Court 
has rejected a certiorari petition by the State of Minnesota, seeking to 
overturn the Martin v. City of Rochester decision. 
These are not the "bad facts" that the State urges upon this 
Court as a justification to discard or modify McCoy. 
C. The State Seeks to Undermine McCoy. 
The State seeks in a clever way to undermine, modify or reverse 
McCoy. On pages 25-26 of its Brief, the State incorrectly characterizes the 
law and then exaggerates a chamber of horrors if McCoy is interpreted 
correctly. First, the State claims matter-of-factly that under the Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act, "The Medicaid recipient must obtain the consent of 
ORS even before filing the claim with the third party." State's Brief p. 25. 
That is an inaccurate statement of the law, since the statute provides only 
that the consent must be obtained before filing a claim for medical benefits that 
the State has paid. There is no general requirement of consent to file a 
personal injury action. 
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The State then claims that an implied basis of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-19-7 is to require the Medicaid recipient to "identify the third party and 
seek consent to include the Medicaid claim in with her claim/' so that "ORS 
[could] make a decision" about its rights. State's Brief p. 25. Under the 
State's view, the ORS could choose to offer the recipient written consent or 
could "investigate the case and pursue its own claim," in which case: 
. . . ORS would have no need to pay an attorney fee to a recipient 
who is litigating issues surrounding compensable damages for 
pain and suffering or future damages. ORS would receive no 
benefit from that litigation. 
State's Brief pps. 25-26 (emphasis added). Of course, this view is completely 
contrary to this Court's holding in McCoy, which is that "each method of 
recovery requires the State to pay its share of attorney fees," including cases 
where the State may "take action directly against the third party, for which 
the State pays its own expenses." McCoy, 999 P.2d at 577 11 19 (emphasis 
added). 
The State then posits bad "examples" of things that could 
happen to prejudice the State if it were not allowed to choose its own counsel 
to pursue a claim. These "examples" basically amount to the Medicaid 
recipient waiting until the eve of settlement to contact the ORS and then 
trying to disadvantage it at the end. See State's Brief p. 26. Implicit in these 
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examples and the argument that goes with them is, once again, the belief that 
the State is somehow prejudiced if it cannot choose its own lawyer and avoid 
contributing a share of the recipients' attorney fees. The implication is that 
if the State must contribute to the attorney fees, it is going to be damaged by 
not collecting the full amount of its lien. These arguments are contrived and 
erroneous, and reflect the State's continued objection to McCoy. 
It is obvious that the State is hoping in Streight for some kind of 
ruling which would lend support to its erroneous interpretation that McCoy, 
despite the clear language to the contrary, allows the State to use its own 
attorney and thus avoid paying its share of attorney fees, even though the 
Medicaid recipient's attorney produced the settlement. The exaggerated, 
lurid set of "facts" should not induce this Court to modify McCoy and allow 
the State to punish "non-cooperative" attorneys by threatening the 
withholding of fees. Alleged "bad facts" are offered to justify bad law. 
Years ago, before McCoy, the State would rather arbitrarily 
decide who would get attorney fees for collecting a lien, and who would not. 
Typically, an assistant attorney general in such cases would watch the 
progression of the case and, when it was near settlement, give notice to 
everyone that it expected to be paid in full and would not be paying a fee. 
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This happened in McCoy, Wallace, and many other cases. R. 639-697. The 
State has frequently taken this position, even after McCoy. For example, in 
Houghton II on remand, the State has claimed that it can use its own lawyers 
to obtain lien reimbursements and avoid paying a whole class of injured 
recipients any share of their attorney fees. Such an interpretation totally 
destroys McCoy. It would return us to the old regimen which allows the State 
a free ride to lien reimbursement without paying the recipient anything for 
the attorney's effort. 
D. This Case Could Never Happen Again. 
The facts of the instant case, as a practical matter, could never 
happen again. Streight is a one-time event. Streight only happened because 
counsel justifiably believed, prior to Wallace, that the State's lien was illegal 
and would not be upheld. See Point III above. Beginning with Wallace and 
S.S., and continuing with Houghton I, McCoy and Houghton II, this Court has 
repeatedly upheld all aspects of the State's lien. No attorney in his right 
mind would seek to settle a Medicaid lien case without notifying the State. 
There is simply no way it can be done legally. 
Additionally, there is no attorney incentive to exclude the State 
under the law promulgated by McCoy. Under McCoy, no matter which way 
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the State chooses to proceed, an attorney's fee is owed. The underlying 
theme of McCoy is that if the recipient's attorney produces the settlement, 
an attorney's fee must be paid regardless of whether the State gave consent, 
withheld consent, or used its own lawyers. Under those circumstances, what 
possible incentive is there not to notify the State as soon as possible? There 
is none. 
An additional reason why the State will always have its lien paid 
in full (absent some necessary compromise due to the vagaries of litigation), 
is the strength of its weapons in its arsenal. See Reply Point I above. It is 
well-known in this litigation that the State may independently sue the third 
party, its insurance company, or the recipient. There is absolutely no 
incentive left not to fully inform the State of the lien from the outset, and to 
cooperate fully. Anything else would be truly foolhardy and all 
knowledgeable lawyers are aware of this. 
The Streight facts, which occurred in 1998 before the Supreme 
Court pronouncements, will never arise again. 
E. McCoy Is Beneficial and Should Be Upheld. 
This Court should absolutely uphold and strongly reaffirm 
McCoy. It is good law and has been very beneficial to the Bar. 
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Before McCoy, it was a common practice for the State to "hold 
back," fail or refuse to give consent to recipients' lawyers in third-party cases 
and assert a lien just before settlement. The State would get a "free ride" and 
demand its full lien after the recipients' counsel had done all the work. That 
is exactly what happened in McCoy and Wallace. 
There are many benefits to McCoy, properly interpreted as urged 
herein. First, private attorneys and the State realize that there is nothing to 
be gained by game playing, so it encourages full disclosure of third-party 
liability information at an early time. Attorneys know that they won't be 
"cheated out of a fee" and that their clients cannot avoid paying the lien. 
Accordingly, there is absolutely no incentive not to cooperate. The State 
likewise knows that it is going to have to pay a 33% attorney fee, so it has no 
incentive to maneuver to avoid paying its fair share of the litigation costs. 
This makes for a much more candid and forthright relationship by all parties 
concerned. 
Second, fairness becomes the guiding principle. The recipient will 
always get a fair-share contribution of the attorney fees. Likewise, the State 
will, under normal circumstances, always get paid. 
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Third, McCoy eases the litigation tension and rancor that 
formerly existed with the State. As can be seen from a recitation of the facts, 
McCoy tried to cooperate but was rebuffed. He thereafter became 
uncooperative. Such hard feelings are unnecessary when it is obvious that 
counsel is going to get paid, and that the State will not come in at the last 
minute and take a free ride on the backs of injured, indigent Medicaid 
recipients. 
Fourth, stare decisis is an important principle, which holds that it 
is the policy of courts to abide by precedent and not disturb a settled point. 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). McCoy , decided in 2000 
by a 3-2 vote, is settled law, and it would be quite unseemly to bounce the 
issue back and forth like a ping pong ball. Stare decisis dictates upholding 
McCoy. 
For all of these reasons, it is extremely important that this Court 
uphold McCoy and resist the aberrant interpretation urged by the State which 
would totally undermine it. McCoy, as originally handed down by this Court, 
and interpreted correctly, has been a good thing for the Bar and for the State. 
It has induced fairness into the system which was formally characterized by 
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical action. It has been a good precedent. 
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CONCLUSION 
The penalty that ORS seeks to enforce - withholding its share 
of attorney fees and suing Streight's counsel - is not supported by, and is 
contrary to, the Utah Code. It is also contradicted by the rule in McCoy. 
ORS has failed to show any meaningful way that the State's interests have 
been prejudiced by Appellants' conduct. The attempt to besmirch the law 
firm is unfortunate. Personal animus by State officials should never drive 
policy. Finally, McCoy is fair and a good rule that has brought order to 
troubled waters. Stare decisis dictates that it should be upheld. 
Appellants respectfully request that the summary judgment 
against the law firm be reversed and that the case be remanded with an 
instruction that ORS offset the recovery against Appellants for reasonable 
attorney fees of 33% pursuant to the statute. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 2003. 
R O ^ T B. SYKES 
CORY B MATTSON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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I hereby certify that true and correct copies of Appellants' 
Reply Brief were served upon all parties of record, at the address listed 
below, by hand delivery on this 4th day of August, 2003: 
Attorneys for State of Utah: 
Stephanie M. Saperstein 
Assistant Attorney General 
515 East 100 South 
P. O. Box 140835 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835 
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Randy Kennard (7907) 
Attorney for Bud & Karen Jensen 
RR1, Box 168 
29900 North 11500 East 
Fairview, Utah 84627 
Telephone, Fax:(435) 427-3630 
Sixth Judicial District for Sanpete County 
State of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OP THE ESTATE 
OF, 
PEGGY SUE STREIGHT 
An incapacitated person 
Bud Jensen and Karen Jensen, 
Co-trustees. 
ORDER 
Case No. 983600026 
Case No. 983600015 
Judge: Kay L. Mclff 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court on 
the 25th day of June 2003; the parties having filed a stipulation 
with the Court which agreement was signed under oath by each of 
the respective parties and approved by their attorneys; Randy 
Kennard appearing on behalf of Bud and Karen Jensen; Brian Dexter 
representing Peggy Sue Streight; the Court having received into 
evidence testimony from Bud Jensen as to the foundation of 
agreement reached between the parties as stated in the filed 
stipulation; the Court having reviewed the stipulation and 
hearing no objection; and having entered it7's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, 
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K R i S T i r j : ." . . . . • - i ' l 
SANPE' ( t " -C00MTi " r:LERK 
NOW HEREBY ORDERS AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The above named co-trustees are hereby authorized to 
sell, and Bud and Karen Jensen as individuals are hereby 
authorized to purchase, the assets of the trust consisting of the 
following: 
a. Home and property located in Sanpete County, Utah. 
b. Approximately 7 acres of land located in Sanpete 
County, Utah* 
for the purchase price of fifty-eight thousand ($58,000.00) 
dollars. 
2. The trustees are authorized to use the cash amount on 
hand in the trust in the approximate amount of three-thousand one 
hundred ($3,100.00) dollars to release the lien on the trust 
property by USDA and to provide clear title to the purchasers. 
3. Upon sale of the trust assets the trustees are directed 
to immediately and without undue delay satisfy the judgment 
against the trust in the approximate amount of $69,332*78 (State 
of Utah, Office of Recovery Services v, Orville and Karen Jensen, 
conservators and guardians, case No. 990600417) pursuant to the 
agreement heretofore reached with between the trustees and the 
State of Utah for the discounted price of fifty-eight thousand 
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($58,000.00) dollars. 
4. The termination of the trust and release of Bud and 
Karen Jensen as trustees shall be accomplished upon proof to the 
Court that the contemplated settlement of the judgment against 
the trust by the State of Utah has been satisfied; upon which 
proof to the Court, appropriate orders shall issue. No further 
accounting being required of any party. 
5. The guardianship and conservatorship of Peggy Sue 
Streight (Case No. 983600015) by Bud and Karen Jensen is hereby 
terminated. No further accounting being required of any party. 
6. All outstanding claims filed by either party in cases no. 
983600026 and 983600015 not addressed herein are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
BY THE COURT this *-<> day of JUNE 2003: 
Approved as to form: 
Brian Dexter, 
Attorney for Peggy Sue Streight 
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